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OBJECTIVE: This study explores the alignment between physicians’
confidence in their diagnoses and the ‘‘correctness’’ of these diagnoses,
as a function of clinical experience, and whether subjects were prone to
over-or underconfidence.
DESIGN: Prospective, counterbalanced experimental design.
SETTING: Laboratory study conducted under controlled conditions at
three academic medical centers.
PARTICIPANTS: Seventy-two senior medical students, 72 senior med-
ical residents, and 72 faculty internists.
INTERVENTION: We created highly detailed, 2-to 4-page synopses of
36 diagnostically challenging medical cases, each with a definitive cor-
rect diagnosis. Subjects generated a differential diagnosis for each of 9
assigned cases, and indicated their level of confidence in each diagnosis.
MEASUREMENTS AND MAIN RESULTS: A differential was considered
‘‘correct’’ if the clinically true diagnosis was listed in that subject’s hy-
pothesis list. To assess confidence, subjects rated the likelihood that
they would, at the time they generated the differential, seek assistance
in reaching a diagnosis. Subjects’ confidence and correctness were
‘‘mildly’’ aligned (k=.314 for all subjects, .285 for faculty, .227 for res-
idents, and .349 for students). Residents were overconfident in 41% of
cases where their confidence and correctness were not aligned, where-
as faculty were overconfident in 36% of such cases and students in
25%.
CONCLUSIONS: Even experienced clinicians may be unaware of the
correctness of their diagnoses at the time they make them. Medical de-
cision support systems, and other interventions designed to reduce
medical errors, cannot rely exclusively on clinicians’ perceptions of
their needs for such support.
KEY WORDS: diagnostic reasoning; clinical decision support; medical
errors; clinical judgment; confidence.
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W hen making a diagnosis, clinicians combine what theypersonally know and remember with what they can ac-
cess or look up. While many decisions will be made based on a
clinician’s own personal knowledge, others will be informed by
knowledge that derives from a range of external sources in-
cluding printed books and journals, communications with
professional colleagues, and, increasingly, a range of compu-
ter-based knowledge resources.1 In general, the more routine
or familiar the problem, the more likely it is that an experi-
enced clinician can ‘‘solve it’’ and decide what to do based on
personal knowledge only. This method of decisionmaking uses
a minimum of time, which is a scarce and precious resource in
health care practice.
Every practitioner’s personal knowledge is, however, in-
complete in various ways, and decisions based on incorrect,
partial, or outdated personal knowledge can result in errors. A
recent landmark study2 has documented that medical errors
are a significant cause of morbidity and mortality in the United
States. Although these errors have a wide range of origins,3
many are caused by a lack of information or knowledge nec-
essary to appropriately diagnose and treat.4 The exponential
growth of biomedical knowledge and shortening half-life of any
single item of knowledge both suggest that modern medicine
will increasingly depend on external knowledge to support
practice and reduce errors.5
Still, the advent of modern information technology has not
changed the fundamental nature of human problem solving.
Diagnostic and therapeutic decisions, for the foreseeable fu-
ture, will be made by human clinicians, not machines. What
has changed in recent years is the potential for computer-
based decision support systems (DSSs) to provide relevant and
patient-specific external knowledge at the point of care, as-
sembling this knowledge in a way that complements and en-
hances what the clinician decision maker already knows.6,7
DSSs can function in many ways, ranging from the generation
of alerts and reminders to the critiquing of management
plans.8–14 Some DSSs ‘‘push’’ information and advice to clini-
cians whether they request it or not; others offer no advice
until it is specifically requested.
The decision support process presupposes the clinician’s
openness to the knowledge or advice being offered. Clinicians
who believe they are correct, or believe they know all they need
to know to reach a decision, will be unmotivated to seek addi-
tional knowledge and unreceptive to any knowledge or sug-
gestions a DSS presents to them. The literatures of psychology
and medical decision making15–18 address the relationship
between these subjective beliefs and objective reality. The
well-established psychological bias of ‘‘anchoring’’15 stipulates
that all human decision makers are more loyal to their current
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ideas, and resistant to changing them, than they objectively
should be in light of compelling external evidence.
This study addresses a question central to the potential
utility and success of clinical decision support. If clinicians’
openness to external advice hinges on their confidence in their
assessments based on personal knowledge, how valid are
these perceptions? Conceptually, there are 4 possible combi-
nations of objective ‘‘correctness’’ of a diagnosis and subjective
confidence in it: 2 in which confidence and correctness are
aligned and 2 in which they are not. The ideal condition is an
alignment of high confidence in a correct diagnosis. Confi-
dence and correctness can also be aligned in the opposing
sense: low confidence in a diagnosis that is incorrect. In this
state, clinicians are likely to be open to advice and disposed to
consult an external knowledge resource. In the ‘‘underconfi-
dent’’ state of nonalignment, a clinician with low confidence in
a correct diagnosis will be motivated to seek information that
will likely confirm an intent to act correctly. However, it is also
possible that a consultation with an external resource can talk
a clinician out of a correct assessment.19 The other nonaligned
state, of greater concern for quality of care, is high confidence
in an incorrect diagnosis. In this ‘‘overconfident’’ state, clini-
cians may not be open or motivated to seek information that
could point to a correct assessment.
This work addresses the following specific questions:
1. In internal medicine, what is the relationship between cli-
nicians’ confidence in their diagnoses and the correctness
of these diagnoses?
2. Does the relationship between confidence and correctness
depend on clinicians’ levels of experience ranging from
medical student to attending physician?
3. To the extent that confidence and correctness are mis-
matched, do clinicians tend toward overconfidence or un-
derconfidence, and does this tendency depend on level of
clinical experience?
One study similar to this one in design and intent,20 but
limited to medical students as subjects, found that students
were frequently unconfident about correct diagnostic judg-
ments when classifying abnormal heart rhythms. Our prelim-
inary study of this question has found the relationship
between correctness and confidence, across a range of train-
ing levels, to be modest at best.21
METHODS
Experimental Design and Dataset
To address these questions, we employed a large dataset orig-
inally collected for a study of the impact of decision support
systems on the accuracy of clinician diagnoses.19 We devel-
oped for this study detailed written synopses of 36 diagnosti-
cally challenging cases from patient records at the University
of Illinois at Chicago, the University of Michigan, and the Uni-
versity of North Carolina. Each institution contributed 12 cas-
es, each with a firmly established final diagnosis. The 2-to 4-
page case synopses were created by three coauthors who are
experienced academic internists (PSH, PSF, TMM). The syn-
opses contained comprehensive historical, examination, and
diagnostic test information. They did not, however, contain re-
sults of definitive tests that would have made the correct di-
agnosis obvious to most or all clinicians. The cases were
divided into 4 approximately equivalent sets balanced by in-
stitution, pathophysiology, organ systems, and rated difficul-
ty. Each set, with all patient-and institution-identifying
information removed, therefore contained 9 cases, with 3 from
each institution.
We then recruited to the study 216 volunteer subjects
from these same institutions: 72 fourth-year medical students,
72 second-and third-year internal medicine residents, and 72
general internists with faculty appointments and at least 2
years of postresidency experience (mean, 11 years). Recruit-
ment was balanced so that each institution contributed 24
subjects at each experience level. Each subject was randomly
assigned to work the 9 cases comprising 1 of the 4 case sets.
Each subject then worked through each of the assigned cases
first without, and then with, assistance from an assigned com-
puter-based decision support system. On the first pass
through each case, subjects generated a diagnostic hypothe-
sis set with up to 6 items. After generating their diagnostic hy-
potheses, subjects indicated their perceived confidence in their
diagnosis in a manner described below. On the second pass
through the case, subjects employed a decision support sys-
tem to generate diagnostic advice, and again offered a differ-
ential diagnosis and confidence ratings. After deleting cases
with missing data, the final dataset for this work consisted of
1,911 cases completed by 215 subjects.
Results reported elsewhere19 indicated that the compu-
ter-based decision support systems engendered modest but
statistically significant improvements in the accuracy of diag-
nostic hypotheses (overall effect size of .32). The questions ad-
dressed by this study, emphasizing the concordance between
confidence and correctness under conditions of uncertainty,
focus on the first pass through each case where the subjects
applied only their personal knowledge to the diagnostic task.
Measures
To assess the correctness of each clinician’s diagnostic hy-
pothesis set for each case, we employed a binary score (correct
or incorrect). We scored a case as correct if the established di-
agnosis for that case, or a very closely related disease, ap-
peared anywhere in the subject’s hypothesis set. Final scoring
decisions, to determine whether a closely related disease
should be counted as correct, were made by a panel comprised
of coauthors PSF, PSH, and TMM. The measure of clinician
confidence was the response to the specific question: ‘‘How
likely is it that you would seek assistance in establishing a di-
agnosis for this case?’’ ‘‘Assistance’’ was not limited to that
which might be provided by a computer. After generating their
diagnostic hypotheses for each case, subjects responded to
this question using an ordinal 1 to 4 response scale with an-
chor points of 1 representing ‘‘unlikely’’ (indicative of high con-
fidence in their diagnosis) and 4 representing ‘‘likely’’
(indicative of low confidence). Because subjects did not receive
feedback, they offered their confidence judgments for each
case without any definitive knowledge of whether their diag-
noses were, in fact, correct. Because they reflect only the sub-
jects’ first pass through each case, these confidence judgments
were not confounded by any advice subjects might later have
received from the decision support systems.
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Analysis
In this study, each data point pairs a subjective confidence
assessment on a 4-level ordinal scale with a binary objective
correctness score. The structure of this experiment and the
resulting data suggested two approaches to analyzing the re-
sults. Given that each subject in this study worked 9 cases,
and offered confidence ratings on a 1 to 4 scale for each case,
interpretations of the meanings of these scale points might be
highly consistent for each subject but highly variable across
subjects. Our first analytic approach therefore sought to iden-
tify an optimal threshold for each subject to distinguish sub-
jective states of ‘‘confident’’ and ‘‘unconfident.’’ This approach
addresses the ‘‘pooling’’ problem, identified by Swets and Pick-
ett,22 that would tend to underestimate the magnitude of the
relationship between confidence and correctness. Our second
analytical approach took the assumption that all subjects
made the same subjective interpretation of the confidence
scale. This second approach entails a direct analysis of the
2-level by 4-level data with no within-subject thresholding.
Qualitatively, the first approach approximates the upper
bound on the relationship between confidence and correct-
ness, while the second approach approximates the lower
bound.
To implement the first approach, we identified, for each
subject, the threshold value along the 1 to 4 scale that max-
imized the proportion of cases where confidence and correct-
ness were aligned. With reference to Table 1, we sought to find
the threshold value that maximized the numbers of cases in
the on-diagonal cells. For 58 subjects (27%), we found that
maximum alignment was achieved by classifying only ratings
of 1 as confident and all other ratings as unconfident; for 105
subjects (49%), maximum alignment was achieved by classi-
fying ratings of 1 or 2 as confident; and for the remaining 52
subjects (24%), maximum alignment was achieved by classi-
fying ratings of 1, 2, or 3 as confident. This finding validated
our assumption that subjects varied in their interpretations of
the scale points. We then created a dataset for further analysis
that consisted, for each case worked by each subject, of a bi-
nary correctness score and a binary confidence score calcu-
lated using each subject’s optimal threshold.
To address the first research question with the first ap-
proach, we computed Kendall’s tb and k coefficients to char-
acterize the relationship between subjects’ correctness and
confidence levels. We then modeled statistically the propor-
tions of cases correctly diagnosed, as a function of confidence
(computed as a binary variable as described above), subjects’
level of training (faculty, resident, student), and the interaction
of confidence and training level. To address the second ques-
tion, we modeled the proportions of cases in which confidence
and correctness were aligned, as a function of training level. To
address the third research question, we focused only on those
cases in which confidence and correctness were not aligned.
We modeled the proportions of cases in which subjects were
overconfident (high confidence in an incorrect diagnosis) as a
function of training level.
All statistical models used the Generalized Linear Model
(GzdLM) procedure23 assuming diagnostic correctness, align-
ment, and overconfidence to be distributed as Bernoulli vari-
ables with a logit link and used naive empirical covariance
estimates24 for the model effects to account for the clustering
of cases within subjects. Wald statistics were employed to test
the observed results against the null condition. Ninety-five
percent confidence intervals were calculated by transforming
logit scale Wald intervals using naive empirical standard error
estimates into percent scale intervals.25 The SPSS for Windows
(SPSS Inc., Chicago, IL) and SAS26 Proc GENMOD (SAS Insti-
tute Inc., Cary, NC) software were employed for statistical
modeling and data analyses.
Our second approach offers a contrasting strategy to ad-
dress the first and second research questions. To this end, we
computed nonparametric correlation coefficients (Kendall’s tb)
between the 2-level variable of correctness and the 4 levels of
confidence from the original data, without thresholding. We
computed separate tb coefficients for subjects at each experi-
ence level, and for the sample as a whole. Correlations were
computed with case as the unit of analysis after exploratory
analyses correcting for the nesting of cases within subjects led
to negligible changes in the results.
The power of the inferential statistics employed in this
analysis was based on the two-tailed t test, as the tests we
performed are analogous to testing differences in means on a
logit scale. Because our tests are based on a priori unknown
marginal cell counts, we halved the sample size to estimate
power. For the analyses addressing research question 1, which
use all cases, power is greater than .96 to detect a small to
moderate effect of .3 standard deviations at an a level of .05.
For analyses addressing research Qquestions 2 and 3, analy-
ses that are based on subsets of cases, the analogous statis-
tical power estimate is greater than .81.
Table 1. Crosstabulation of Correctness and Confidence for Each Clinical Experience Level and for All Subjects, with Optimal Thresholding
for Each Subject
Experience Level Correctness of Diagnosis High Confidence Low Total
Correct 63 (55 to 71) 105 (88 to 125) 168 (146 to 192)
Students Incorrect 35 (27 to 43) 442 (422 to 459) 477 (453 to 499)
Total 98 (72 to 132) 547 (513 to 573) 645
Correct 140 (129 to 150) 141 (124 to 159) 281 (256 to 306)
Residents Incorrect 98 (88 to 109) 259 (241 to 276) 357 (332 to 382)
Total 238 (193 to 287) 400 (351 to 445) 638
Correct 167 (155 to 178) 144 (128 to 160) 311 (293 to 339)
Faculty Incorrect 80 (69 to 92) 237 (221 to 253) 317 (299 to 346)
Total 247 (205 to 300) 381 (338 to 433) 628
Correct 370 (352 to 388) 390 (357 to 425) 760 (713 to 808)
All subjects Incorrect 213 (195 to 231) 938 (903 to 971) 1,151 (1,103 to 1,198)
Total 583 (527 to 667) 1,328 (1,246 to 1,405) 1,911
Cells contain counts of cases, with 95% confidence intervals in parentheses.
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RESULTS
Results with Threshold Correction
Table 1 displays the crosstabulation of correctness of diagno-
sis and binary levels of confidence (with 95% confidence in-
terval) for all subjects and separately for each clinical
experience level, using each subject’s optimal threshold to di-
chotomize the confidence scale. The difficulty of these cases is
evident from Table 1, as 760 of 1,911 (40%) were correctly di-
agnosed by the full set of subjects. Diagnostic accuracy in-
creased monotonically with subjects’ clinical experience. The
difficulty of the cases is also reflected in the distribution of the
confidence ratings, with subjects classified as confident for
583 (31%) of 1,911 cases, after adjustment for varying inter-
pretations of the scale. These confidence levels revealed the
same general monotonic relationship with clinical experience.
Across the entire sample of subjects, confidence and correct-
ness were aligned for 1,308 of 1,911 cases (68%), correspond-
ing to Kendall’s tb=.321 (Po.0001) and a k value of .314.
Alignment was seen in 64% of cases for faculty (tb=.291
[Po.0001]; k=.285), 63% for residents (tb=.230 [Po.0001];
k=.227), and 78% for students (tb=.369 [Po.0001]; k=.349).
Figure 1 offers a graphical portrayal, for each experience
level, of the proportions of correct diagnoses as a function of
confidence, with 95% confidence intervals. The relationship
between correctness and confidence, at each level, is seen in
the differences between these proportions.
Wald statistics generated by the statistical model reveal a
significant alignment between diagnostic correctness and con-
fidence across all subjects (w2=199.64, df=1, Po.0001). Sig-
nificant relationships are also seen between correctness and
training level (w2=20.40, df=2, Po.0001) and in the interac-
tion between confidence and training level (w2=17.00, df=2,
Po.0002). Alignment levels for faculty and residents differ
from those of the students (Po.05); and from inspection of
Figure 1 it is evident that students’ alignment levels are higher
than those of faculty or residents.
With reference to the third research question, Table 2
summarizes the case frequencies for which clinicians at each
level were correctly confident—where confidence was aligned
with correctness—as well as frequencies for the ‘‘nonaligned’’
cases where they were overconfident and underconfident. Stu-
dents were overconfident in 25% of nonaligned cases, corre-
sponding to 5% of cases they completed. Residents were
overconfident in 41% of nonaligned cases, and 15% of cases
overall. Faculty physicians were overconfident in 36% of non-
aligned cases, and 13% of cases overall.
All subjects were more likely to be underconfident than
overconfident (w2=29.05, Po.0001). Students were found to
be more underconfident than residents (Wald statistics:
w2=6.19, df=2, Po.05). All other differences between sub-
jects’ experience levels were not significant.
Results Without Threshold Correction
The second approach to analysis yielded Kendall tb measures
of association between the binary measure of correctness and
the 4-level measure of confidence, computed directly from the
study data, without any corrections. For all subjects and cas-
es, we observed tb=.106 (N=1,911 cases; Po.0001). Sepa-
rately for each level of training, Kendall coefficients are: faculty
tb=.103 (n=628; Po.005), residents tb=.041 (n=638; NS),
and students tb=.121 (n=645 cases; Po.001). The polarity
of the relationship is as would be expected, associating
correctness of diagnosis with higher confidence levels. The tb
values reported here can be compared with their counter-
parts, reported above, for the analyses that included threshold
correction.
DISCUSSION
The assumption built into the first analytic strategy, that sub-
jects make internally consistent but personally idiosyncratic
interpretations of confidence, generates what may be termed
upper-bound estimates of alignment between confidence and
correctness. Under the assumptions embedded in this analy-
sis, the results of this study indicate that the correctness of
clinicians’ diagnoses and their perceptions of the correctness
of these diagnoses are, at most, moderately aligned. The cor-
rectness and confidence of faculty physicians and senior med-
ical residents were aligned about two thirds of the time—and in
Table 2. Breakdown of Under- and Overconfidence for Cases in Which Clinician Confidence and Correctness Are Nonaligned
Experience
Level
Proportion of Cases that
Were Nonaligned
Percentage of Nonaligned Cases
Reflecting Underconfidence
Percentage of Nonaligned Cases
Reflecting Overconfidence
StudentsQ6 140/645 75.0 (65.2 to 82.8) 25.0 (17.2 to 34.8)
Residents 239/638 59.0 (50.7 to 66.8) 41.0 (33.2 to 49.3)
Faculty 224/628 64.3 (55.4 to 72.3) 35.7 (27.7 to 44.6)
All subjects 603/1911 64.7 (59.5 to 69.5) 35.3 (30.5 to 40.5)
Parentheses contain 95% confidence intervals.































FIGURE 1. Proportions of cases correctly diagnosed at each con-
fidence level, with thresholding to achievemaximum calibration of
each subject. Brackets indicate 95% confidence intervals for each
proportion.
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cases where correctness and confidence were not aligned,
these subjects were more likely to be underconfident than
overconfident. While faculty subjects demonstrated tenden-
cies toward greater alignment and less frequent overconfi-
dence than residents, these differences were not statistically
significant. Students’ results were substantially different from
those of their more experienced colleagues, as their confidence
and correctness were aligned about four fifths of the time and
more highly skewed, when nonaligned, toward underconfi-
dence. The alignment between ‘‘being correct’’ and ‘‘being con-
fident’’—within groups and for all subjects—would be
qualitatively characterized as ‘‘fair,’’ as seen by k coefficients
in the range .2 to .4.27
The more conservative second mode of analysis yielded
smaller relationships between correctness and confidence, as
seen in the tb coefficient for all subjects, which is smaller by a
factor of three. For the residents, the relationship between cor-
rectness and confidence does not exceed chance expectations
when computed without thresholding. Comparison across ex-
perience levels reveals the same trend seen in the primary
analysis, with students displaying the highest level of align-
ment.
The greater apparent alignment for the students, under
both analytic approaches, may be explained by the difficulty of
the cases. The students were probably overmatched by many
of these cases, perhaps guessing at diagnoses, and were al-
most certainly aware that they were overmatched. This is seen
in the low proportions of correct diagnoses for students and
the low levels of expressed confidence. These skewed distribu-
tions would generate alignment between correctness and con-
fidence of 67% by chance alone. While students’ alignments
exceeded these chance expectations, a better estimate of their
concordance between confidence and correctness might be ob-
tained by challenging the students with less difficult cases,
making the diagnostic task as difficult for them as it was for
the faculty and residents with the cases employed in this
study. We do not believe it is valid to conclude from these re-
sults that the students are ‘‘more aware’’ than experienced cli-
nicians of when they are right and wrong.
By contrast, residents and faculty correctly diagnosed
44% and 50% of these difficult cases, respectively, and gener-
ated distributions of confidence ratings that were less skewed
than those of the students. In cases for which these clinicians’
correctness and confidence were not aligned, both faculty and
residents showed an overall tendency toward underconfidence
in their diagnoses. Despite the general tendency toward un-
derconfidence, residents and faculty in this study were over-
confident, placing credence in a diagnosis that was in fact
incorrect, in 15% (98/938) and 12% (80/928) of cases, respec-
tively. Because these two more experienced groups are directly
responsible for patient care, and offered much more accurate
diagnoses for these difficult cases, findings for these groups
take on a different interpretation and perhaps greater potential
significance.
In designing the study, we approached the measurement
of ‘‘confidence’’ by grounding it in hypothetical clinical be-
havior. Rather than asking subjects directly to estimate their
confidence levels in either probabilistic or qualitative terms, we
asked them for the likelihood of their seeking help in reaching
a diagnosis for each case. We considered this measure to be a
proxy for ‘‘confidence.’’ Because our intent was to inform the
design of decision support systems and medical error reduc-
tion efforts generally, we believe that this behavioral approach
to assessment of confidence lends validity to our conclusions.
Limitations of this study include restriction of the task to
diagnosis. Differences in results may be seen in clinical tasks
other than diagnosis, such as determination of appropriate
therapy for a problem already diagnosed. The cases, chosen to
be very difficult and with definitive findings excluded, certainly
generated lower rates of accurate diagnoses than are typically
seen in routine clinical practice. Were the cases in this study
more routine, this may have affected the measured levels of
alignment between confidence and correctness. In addition,
this study was conducted in a laboratory setting, using written
case synopses, to provide experimental precision and control.
While the case synopses contained very large amounts of clin-
ical information, the task environment for these subjects was
not the task environment of routine patient care. Clinicians
might have been more, or less, confident in their assessments
had the cases used in the study been real patients for whom
these clinicians were responsible; and in actual practice, phy-
sicians may be more likely to consult on difficult cases regard-
less of their confidence level. While we employed volunteer
subjects in this study, the sample sizes at each institution for
the resident and faculty groups were large relative to the sizes
at each institution of their respective populations, and thus
unlikely to be skewed by sampling bias.
The relationships, of ‘‘fair’’ magnitude, between correct-
ness and confidence were seen only after adjusting each sub-
ject’s confidence ratings to reflect differing interpretations of
the confidence scale. The secondary analytic approach, which
does not correct individuals’ judgments against their own op-
timal thresholds, results in observed relationships between
correctness and confidence that are smaller. Under either set
of assumptions, the relationship between confidence and cor-
rectness is such that designers of clinical decision support
systems cannot assume clinicians to be accurate in their own
assessments of when they do and do not require assistance
from external knowledge resources.
This work was supported by grant R01-LM-05630 from the
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SGIM 28th Annual Meeting
May 11–14, 2005
New Orleans, Louisiana
Out of Chaos: The Critical Role of Generalists
Register Online at http://www.sgim.org/am
Second Annual SGIM Visiting Professor Program in Geriatrics Gerontology
Thursday, May 12, 2005:
12:00–1:00 pm: Interest Group IT09: Geriatrics Interest Group Meeting
Session Coordinator: C Bree Johnston, MD, Associate Professor, University of California, San Francisco
1:30 to 3 pm: Abstract Session D4 Geriatrics. Session Moderators: Claudia Beghé, MD and Christine K. Cassel, MD
5:00–7:00 pm: Poster Session 1
All the geriatrics posters will be grouped together and presented during this session.
7:00–9:00 pm
Keynote Lecture and Reception
If Generalists Defined Quality of Care: What the World Needs From Us
Christine K. Cassel, MD
Friday, May 13, 2005
7:00–8:30 am: Walking Poster Session: Dr. Cassell will lead a ‘‘walk and talk’’ tour of the posters first presented on Thursday
evening.
The SGIM Visiting Professor in Geriatrics & Gerontology is sponsored in 2005 by an unrestricted educational grant from the Merck
Institute of Aging and Health.
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